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INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC
RELATIONS-
SOME ASPECTS OF THE TURMOIL
IN THE INTENTIONAL TORTS
By LYN L. STEVENS*
Over the years, the common law has developed a number of causes of ac-
tion which use intention to injure economic interests as the basis for imposing
liability in tort. The aim of the common law is to protect plaintiffs against
intentionally inflicted economic loss by permitting recovery where defendants
commit any of the nominate torts of inducing breach of contract, conspiracy
by lawful and unlawful means, and intimidation, or the innominate tort of
causing loss by unlawful means. For a number of reasons, these torts have
developed in an illogical and piecemeal fashion, with the result that, today,
many of the principles concerning the intentional torts are still unclear. It is
the purpose of this paper to examine and analyse some of the recent develop-
ments in these intentional torts. Special consideration will be given to review-
ing recent judicial trends in the tort of inducing breach of contract and in
the innominate tort of unlawful interference. In this way it may be possible to
discern notable developments in relation to the intentional torts generally. An
attempt will also be made to ascertain the likely direction of future develop-
ments in this area. It is conceivable that these torts are presently in the pro-
cess of regrouping and may thus present a more united and consistent front
as an independent entity in the law of torts.
While the common law has been gradually moving towards affording
wider protection to plaintiffs in the area of intentionally inflicted economic
loss, the same cannot be said in relation to negligent liability. Where the
interference with economic interests has been caused by negligence, the law
has not been generous to plaintiffs.' An important exception to this hesistancy
to protect against negligent interference was introduced in 1963 when the
House of Lords, in Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.,2 decided
that an action in negligence might lie where careless words or advice caused
* Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New Zealand, visiting Assistant
Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia.
I See J. A. Jolowicz, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (9th ed. London: Sweet and
Maxwell, 1971) at 51, and John Fleming, The Law of Torts (4th ed. Sydney: Law Book
Company, 1971) at 160 [hereinafter Fleming].
2, [19641 A.C. 465.
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pure financial loss.3 Nevertheless where negligent acts have caused injury to
a plaintiff's economic interests, the courts have consistently refused to impose
liability.4
There are a number of strong policy arguments behind the limited role
of negligence in protecting financial losses. These have been canvassed else-
where and need not be discussed herein.5 However, where economic losses
are caused by intentional conduct, many of the policy factors relevant to
negligence are no longer present and are replaced by other policy considera-
tions which have led the courts to impose liability on defendants under the
intentional torts. As stated by Fleming: 6 "Reluctant as we have seen the
common law to be in protecting economic interests against negligence, our
legal tradition has displayed no similar coyness in furnishing legal sanctions
against conduct deliberately aimed at impairing advantageous relations or
causing other kinds of financial loss."
The hallmark of the various causes of action to be examined is the
presence of an intention in the defendant to cause economic harm to the
plaintiff. The concept of "intention" has been the subject of extensive juris-
prudential analysis7 and it is not proposed to pursue that analysis herein.
Nevertheless, it is appropriate that some attempt be made to outline the
parameters of the concept for the purposes of this paper. One form of inten-
tion, for example, is that state of mind existing in a defendant where the
consequences of the invasion of another person's interests are both foreseen
and desired. Thus, to determine whether a wrong has been committed inten-
tionally, one might ask whether the defendant in doing a particular act has
foreseen and desired the invasion of the plaintiff's economic interests as a
consequence. However, it should also be noted that intention may encom-
pass more than a desire to bring about a result which causes injury to an-
8 Liability will be imposed on the defendant when the circumstances reveal a "special
relationship" between the parties. The Hedley Byrne principle has been accepted with-
out question as the law in Canada. See Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. The Metropolitan
Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, [1971] S.C.R. 957; Windsor Motors Ltd. v. District
of Powell River (1969), 4 D.L.R. (3d) 155 (B.C.S.C.); and see also the dicta favouring
the applicability of the principle in J. Nunes Diamonds Ltd. v. Dominion Electric Pro-
tection Co. (1972), 26 D.L.R. (3d) 699 (S.C.C.), especially the judgment of Pigeon J.,
at 723-730; and Sealand of the Pacific Ltd. v. Ocean Cement Ltd. (1973), 33 D.L.R.(3d) 625 (B.C.S.C.).
4 Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co. (1875), L.R. 10 Q.B. 453; S.C.M. (United
Kingdom) Ltd. v. W. L. Whittall & Son Ltd., [1971] 1 Q.B. 337 (Eng. C.A.); Spartan
Steel and Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd., [1973] 1 Q.B. 27 (Eng. C.A.).
And in Canada, see Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works and Walkam
Machinery & Equipment Ltd., [1972] 3 W.W.R. (B.C.C.A.).
5 See P.S. Atiyah, Negligence and Economic Loss (1957), 83 Law Quarterly
Review 248; the Canadian position is considered by LL. Stevens, Negligent Acts
qausing Pure Financial Loss - Policy Factors at Work (1973), 23 U. of T. L.J. 431.
G Fleming at 539.
7 See, for example, 0. W. Holmes, The Common Law, ed. by M. De Wolfe Howe
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), Lecture IV, "Fraud, Malice and Intent
- The Theory of Torts"; 0. W. Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent (1894), 8 Harvard
L.R. 1; Glanville Williams, Salmond's Jurisprudence (19th ed. London: Sweet
and Maxwell, 1947), chapter 18 "Intention and Negligence."
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other. It will exist where the wrongdoer believes or ought to have believed
that harmful consequences are substantially certain to follow from what he
does, although these consequences need not necessarily be the ones he ex-
pected.8 Thus where a lighted squib is thrown into a crowded marketplace,
the actor might not desire to injure anyone. Yet, since he must believe and
know that somebody is substantially certain to be injured, he will be held to
have intended such a result.9
If the actor foresees that certain consequences might follow, to the
extent that he has knowledge and appreciation of the risk of harm, but the
risk falls short of substantial certainty, he cannot be said to have intended any
resulting injury. This is the point on the scale where the actor's conduct is
classed as negligent. This scale or "external standard" was described by
Holmes as follows :10
If the manifest probability of harm is very great, and the harm follows, we say
that it is done maliciously or intentionally; if not so great, but still considerable,
we say the harm is done negligently; if there is no apparent danger, we call it
mischance.
For present purposes, the important point is to distinguish between
intention and negligence. However, it is apposite to note that if the cir-
cumstances in which the defendant acted reveal a high degree of risk the
conduct may be described as reckless or wanton. The terms "wilfulness" or
"gross negligence" may also be used to indicate conduct falling between
carelessness and intention.1 This aggravated form of negligence, or "quasi-
intent' 2 has been much analysed by commentators, 13 and should be noted
as falling in the scale of conduct somewhere between intention and negligence.
As will be illustrated later, the courts have regarded reckless or wanton con-
duct as sufficient to found an action under one of the intentional torts.
It is also important that "intention" be distinguished from "malice".
The term "malice", which is sometimes used synonomously with intention,14
has had many different meanings ascribed to it. One such meaning is malice
in law, which has been defined as a "wrongful act done intentionally without
just cause or excuse". 15 This type of malice has been identified as a fore-
runner of the various torts based on wrongful and unjustified intention.'0
8 See W. L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (3rd ed. St. Paul: West Pub-
lishing, 1964) at 32.
9 See Scott v. Shepherd (1773), 2 Win. BI. 892.
10 O. W. Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent (1894), 8 Harv. L.R. 1.
I See Fleming, 120-121.
12The term is used by S. D. Elliott, Degrees of Negligence (1932), 6 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 91 at 143.
13A convenient summary is contained in Prosser, supra, note 8 at 187-188.
'4 See 0. W. Holmes, supra, note 10 at 1 ("If the manifest probability of harm
is very great, and the harm follows, we say that it was done maliciously or
intentionally...").
15 See Bromage v. Prosser (1825), 4 B. & C. 247, per Bayley, J.
1 Such as interfering with contractual relations, and conspiracy by lawful or
unlawful means. See G. H. L. Fridman, Malice and the Law of Torts (1958), 21 Modem
L. Rev. 484 at 499.
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Malice of this variety is really broader than mere intention; it is an intention
to bring about consequences which are wrongful or tortious in themselves.
Malice in law must not be confused with malice in fact 17 or improper
motive. This form of malice is not concerned with the result contemplated
(tortious consequences) but with the purpose or object of the conduct
(wrongful motive). When a person acts, there may be desired consequences
going beyond the primary consequences of the conduct, consequences ulterior
to the infliction of harm to the interests of the plaintiff. These consequences
are nevertheless intended by the wrongdoer and may be described as the
product of an "ulterior intent' 8 or improper motive. This second type of
malice constitutes an important element in some of the economic torts.' 9
For example, malice might be an important part of the original cause of
action, as with injurious falsehood, where it is said to be the gist of the
action.20 Alternatively, malice in the sense of improper motive might be a
vital element in the tort of conspiracy by lawful means - an improper
motive may make a combination actionable,2 1 by negativing the possibility of
any justification for the defendant's action. Thus it is clear that the use of
the word "malice" does not end the inquiry but rather serves to stimulate
further investigation of the defendant's actions.
I EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
Before examining some of the important recent developments in the in-
tentional torts, some references should be made to the significant features of
the early growth of these torts. It must be said at the outset that many of
the cases and developments outlined below occurred in what might be de-
scribed as a "labour relations context". No attempt has been made to analyse
this aspect of the cases for to do so would have expanded the analysis sig-
nificantly and introduced another element into an already complicated and
sometimes contradictory area.
The early history of the economic torts appeared to be laying a basis
for a broad tort based largely on intention. Evidence of this can be found in
the words of Holt, CJ., in 1706, in Keeble v. Hickeringil,22 where it was
flatly and simply stated that: "he who hinders another in his trade or live-
lihood is liable to an action for so hindering him." This dictum has since
17 This is an old term used by Bayley, J., in Bromage v. Prosser, supra, note 15.
For a more recent judicial consideration of this point, see Jones Brothers (Hunstanton)
Ltd. v. Stevens, [1955] 1 Q.B. 275, per Lord Goddard, CJ. at 280.18 The term used by Salmond, supra, note 7 at 383.
10 See John Fleming, An Introduction to the Law of Torts (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1967) at 216; also, J. F. Lever, "Means, Motives and Interest in the Law of
Torts" in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (London: Oxford University Press, 1961)
at 50.
2 0 London Ferro Concrete Co. v. Justicz (1951), 68 R.P.C. 261, 265 per Birkett, LJ.
2 1 See J. F. Lever, supra, note 19 at 57; and J. D. Heydon, The Defence of
Justification in Cases of Intentionally Caused Economic Loss (1970), 20 U. of T. LJ.
139 at 150 et seq. See also, J.D. Heydon, Economic Torts (London: Sweet and Max-
well, 1973) at 13 et seq.
22 (1706), 11 East 574. See also Carrington v. Taylor (1809), 11 East 571.
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been held to have stated the position too widely. In Allen v. Flood23 the
House of Lords ruled that where there was no question of conspiracy, the
doing of an act which is in itself quite lawful will not become unlawful by
reason of the intentional interference with the plaintiff's economic interests.
24
While the English courts thus appeared to be moving away from resting
liability solely on the defendant's intention, some of the American courts took
what seems to be at first blush a decidely opposite approach. For example,
Keeble v. Hickeringil12 5 was used by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in
Tuttle v. Buck2 6 as authority for the proposition that recovery should be
allowed where the defendant deliberately interfered with the plaintiff's eco-
nomic expectations. The result has been the development in America of the
"prima facie tort doctrine '27 under which considerable emphasis is placed on
problems of justification. This doctrine has not however caused liability to
arise in America over vast areas where it would not have arisen in England. 28
An examination of the cases cited by Prosser2 as illustrative of the prima
facie tort, reveals that most, if not all, could have been decided on some
ground other than the intention on the part of the defendant to cause
economic loss. In other words, the English or the Canadian common law
would have imposed liability on the defendants, although reliance would have
been placed on a conspiracy or the presence of illegal means as a basis for
such liability. Nonetheless, the resort to the prima facie tort doctrine in
America has resulted in a shift of emphasis in the deciding of cases, namely
a concentration on the questions of justification, rather than a preoccupation
(as in England and Canada) with the complex components of different causes
of action.30
In the twentieth century, the English and Canadian courts have con-
sistently refrained from imposing liability for a wrongful intention without
more. The case which finally decided that the prima fade tort doctrine was
not part of the common law was Allen v. Flood.31 The plaintiff shipwright
had been lawfully dismissed from his job after his employer had been told by
23, [1898] A.C. 1.
24 This point is made especially clearly in the judgments of Lord Watson (at 102
et seq.) and Lord Hersehell (at 132 et seq.).
25 (1706), 11 East 574.
26 (1909), 107 Minn. 145; 119 N.W. 946. The brief facts which led to the imposi-
tion of liability on the defendant were that economic loss had been inflicted on the
plaintiff barber shop operator, when the defendant, acting out of spiteful ends and not
genuine competitive interest, set up a rival barber shop.
27 The genesis of this tort may well have been the article of 0. W. Holmes, see,
supra, note 10. For a detailed discussion of the prima facie tort, see M. D. Forkosch,
An Analysis of the Prima Facie Tort Cause of Action, (1957), 42 Cornell L.Q. 465.
28 See J. D. Heydon, Economic Torts, supra, note 21 at 177.
2 9 Prosser, supra, note 9 at 980.
3o The American Courts have recently been flirting with a new theory of tort
liability involving intentionally caused loss through the infringement of contemporary
moral standards. See Morrison v. National Broadcasting Company (1965), 266 N.Y.S.
2d 406. For a discussion of the decision, see J.D. Heydon, Economic Torts, supra, note
21 at 94 et seq.
31, [1898] A.C. 1 (H.L.).
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the defendant union official that his members would stop work or be called
out, unless the plaintiff (a worker from a different craft) was discharged from
his job. The House of Lords held that, irrespective of the motive of the
defendant, he could not individually be liable in tort. Intention to injure,
even with an unjustifiable motive, was not actionable unless there was a
combination. The existence of malice in the defendant did not in and of itself
create a cause of action in the plaintiff. Interference with trade or employ-
ment without interfering with an existing contract, without a conspiracy or
the use of unlawful means was held to not be a tort.82 This statement appears
to represent the current Canadian law on this subject.33
The principle that there can be no action based on one person's intention
to cause another economic loss has not been universally embraced by the
judiciary. There are a number of judicial statements which may be cited to
show that the Tuttle v. Buck 4 tort is not regarded as such remote a prospect
as the judgements in Allen v. Flood3 r would appear to indicate. In Sorrell v.
Smith,"" Viscount Cave, L.C., stated that:
... it does not necessarily follow that the existence of a combination is essential
to the commission of the offence. There is some authority for the view that what
is unlawful in two is not lawful in one. . . .37
Lord Summer, in the same case, was unwilling to concede that the matter
had been finally settled, 8  while Lord Loreburn also believed 9 that no ex-
haustive answer had been given to the question. More recently,4 0 Lord Devlin
countenanced the possibility of a Tuttle v. Buck type action, describing it as
"Quinn v. Leathem without the conspiracy." 4 '
One must nevertheless conclude that the tort consisting of a single person
intentionally interfering with trade, business or financial expectations finds
82 There have been a number of surprising applications of this principle. For
example, see Chapman v. Honig, [1963] 2 Q.B. 502 (Eng. C.A.) and Hargreaves v.
Bretherton, 11959] 1 Q.B. 45 (Eng. C.A.). In each case it was decided that the de-
fendant would not be liable for intentionally causing harm to the plaintiff. In both cases,
the means used were not characterized as unlawful - contempt of court in Chapman
and perjury in Hargreaves - and the Allen v. Flood rule consequently operated to. bar
recovery.33 Sutherland v. Sutherland, [1947] 1 W.W.R. 202 (B.C.S.C.); Therien v. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters (1960), 22 D..1R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.); Orchard v.
Tunney, (1957) 8 D.L.R. (2d) 273 (S.C.C.); and Gagnon v. Foundation Maritime Ltd.,[1961] S.C.R. 435.
14 (1909), 107 Minn. 145; 119 N.W. 946.
35, [1898] A.C. 1.
16, [1925] A.C. 700 (H.L.).
S7 ld. at 713. Viscount Cave cited dicta in support from Kearney v. Lloyd (1890),
26 L.R. Ir. 268, per Palles, C.B., 280; Giblan v. National Amalgamated Labourers'
Union of Great Britain and Ireland, [1903] 2 K.B. 600, per Romer, L.J at p. 619; and
Huntley v. Simmons, [1898] 1 Q.B. 181. Viscount Cave's judgment was concurred in by
Lord Atkinson.
88 Id. at 739-741.
89 Conway v. Wade, [1909] A.C. 506 at 510.
4 0 Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129.
41 Id. at 1251.
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no unchallenged place in the law.42 The dictum of Bowen, L.J., in Mogul S. S.
Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co.48 that "intentionally to do that which is cal-
culated in the ordinary course of events to damage, and which does, in fact,
damage another in that other's property or trade is actionable if done without
just cause or excuse," 44 has become a legal reality. Instead, English law has
granted remedies for intentionally inflicted economic loss by finding the de-
fendant's conduct to "fit in" to the elements of the various economic torts;
the Canadian Courts have largely tended to mirror this approach.45
Having examined some early trends, it is now appropriate to consider
the recent developments in the economic torts. First, we will discuss those
developments connected with the tort of inducing breach of contract, and
secondly, reference will be made to the emergence of the innominate tort of
causing loss by unlawful means.
II INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT
In Quinn v. Leathem46 Lord MacNaghten stated that "a violation of
a legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action, and ... it is a viola-
tion of a legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognised by law
if there be no sufficient justification for the interference." 47 Although this is a
satisfactory starting point for a discussion of the essential ingredients of the
cause of action involving inducing breach of contract, it presents an overly
simplistic view of the elements of this tort. The courts have in recent times
recognised that there are, in fact, six essential elements of this tort.48 There
is general agreement49 that "inducing breach of contract" entails:
(1) intention to cause loss;
(2) knowledge of an existing contract;
(3) breach of an existing contract;
(4) wrongful procurement;
(5) actual damage as a necessary consequence; and
(6) lack of justification.
42 Lord Dunedin has characterized any suggestions to the contrary as "the leading
heresy". See Sorrell v. Smith, [1925] A.C. 700 at 710. Lord Donovan also doubted the
existence of such a tort in Stratford & Son v. Lindley, [1965] A.C. 269.
43 (1889), 23 Q.B.D. 598 (Eng. C.A.).
44 Id. at 613.
45 For a useful summary of the Canadian law on some of the economic torts, see
A.W.R. Carrothers, Collective Bargaining Law in Canada, (Toronto: Butterworths,
1965) Chapter 26.
46, [1901] A.C. 495.
47 Id. at 510.
48 The genesis of this tort was Lumley v. Gye (1853), 2 E. & B. 216, a case in-
volving the inducement of a breach of contract between master and servant. The tort
was very quickly expanded to apply to contracts of all kinds. See Stratford & Son Ltd.
v. Lindley, [1965] A.C. 269.
49 See J. F. Clerk and W. H. B. Lindsell, The Law of Torts (13th ed. London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 1969) at 379 et seq.; Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, supra, note 1,
at 454 et seq.; and A. W. R. Carrothers, supra, note 45, at 471 et seq.
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It is proposed to deal at length with three of these ingredients, namely, the
knowledge and the intention requirements, and the necessity that there be a
breach of an existing contract. The recent material on the remaining three
requirements has been well analysed in the textbooks and articles.5°
A The Knowledge Requirement
(i) How much knowledge is required?
As recently as 1964, in Stratford & Son Ltd. v. Lindley,5' in the English
Court of Appeal, it was postulated that "it must be shown that the defendants
knew of the relevant terms of the contracts .".2 This view had for some
time represented the requisite standard of knowledge required to be proven
in an inducing breach of contract action.53 However, the House of Lords in
the Stratford case appeared to relax this "relevant terms" standard. The
facts of the case raised the question of whether the defendant union officials
had sufficient knowledge of the barge repair contract, the breaches of which
they were alleged to have induced. Lord Pearce responded as follows:
It is no answer to a claim based on wrongfully inducing a breach of contract,
to assert that the defendants did not know with exactitude all the terms of the
contract. The relevant question is whether they had sufficient knowledge of the
terms to know that they were inducing a breach of contract.54
Lord Reidra and Viscount Radcliffe5 6 were also prepared to accept substan-
tially less than actual knowledge of precise contractual terms.
The Canadian authorities support the view that something less than
actual knowledge of the relevant terms of the contract will suffice to support
an action. Among the requirements for liability considered necessary by
Gale, J., in Posluns v. Toronto Stock Exchange5 7 was the requirement that
"the defendant.., was or can be assumed to have been aware of the existence
of [the] contract."' 8 In considering the issue of knowledge on the part of the
defendant Stock Exchange, the judge held that the Exchange was aware that
some contract of employment existed between the plaintiff employee and his
employer. Furthermore, the Exchange must have intended that the contract
was to be ended by whatever means were necessary in the circumstances,
including breach. Significantly, the judge added: "that the precise terms of
60 As to wrongful procurement and the damage requirement, see Clerk & Lindsell,
supra, note 49 at 387-394; Y.W. Salmond, Salmond on Torts (13th ed. London: Sweet
and Maxwell, 1969) at 497 et seq. And on the question of justification, see J.D. Heydon,
Justification in Economic Loss (1970), 20 U. of T. LJ. 139 at 161-170.
51, [1965] A.C. 269.
52 Per Denning, M.R., [1965] A.C. 269 at 288.
53Thomson (D.C.) & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin, [1952] 1 Ch. 646, per Jenkins, L.J. at
697; and Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129, per Lord Devlin, at 1212.
54, [1965] A.C. 269 at 332.
55 Id. at 324.
Ucld. at 328.
57 (1965), 46 D.L.R. (2d) 210 (Ont. H.C.).
58 Id. at 262.
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the contract were not known to the governors [of the Exchange] is quite
immaterial." 9
Therefore, while the knowledge requirement remains an important
ingredient to the cause of action, the courts seem more willing than before
to allow plaintiffs to succeed upon proof of meagre evidence of knowledge by
the defendant of the contraet.0 The question immediately arises as to how
little knowledge a defendant may have and still satisfy the knowledge re-
quirement. What if the defendant is reckless or closes his eyes as to whether
or not there is a contract? Are there circumstances in which the courts will
find that the defendant has constructive knowledge?
The authorities hitherto considered do not expressly say that constructive
knowledge will suffice, although some of the language used by the judges does
suggest this. For example, Lord Reid in the Stratford case6' considered that
it was "reasonable to infer" that the defendants had the requisite knowledge
of the contracts. Two decisions have, however, given detailed consideration
to the issue of knowledge of the contract. Both of these support the view
that the courts can use constructive knowledge to satisfy this requirement of
liability.
The first case, Emerald Construction Co. Ltd. v. Lowthian62 deals with
reckless defendants. The plaintiff had entered into a "labour only" contract
with certain main contractors for a power station. The defendant union offi-
cials caused this contract to be breached by advising union members not to
work on the construction site. The issue was whether, even though they did
not know of the precise terms of the contracts, they could be found liable in
tort. Lord Denning, M.R., stated that:
Even if they did not know of the actual terms of the contract, but had the
means of knowledge - which they deliberately disregarded - that would be
enough. Like the man who turns a blind eye. So here, if the officers deliberately
sought to get this contract terminated, heedless of its terms, regardless whether
it was terminated by breach or not, they would do wrong.63
In the second case, James McMahon Ltd. v. James Dunne,64 the court
could not say that the defendants were reckless. It was a question of whether
the defendant union officials could be fixed with sufficient knowledge of tim-
ber contracts between the plaintiff importers and third parties. The de-
fendants were alleged to have procured the breach of these contracts by
operating an embargo against building materials coming into the port of
69 Id. at 268. For further support for this view, see Northern Messenger (Calgary)
Ltd. v. Frost (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 456 at 464 Alta. (S.C.): "Whether [the defendants]
were aware of the precise terms of the contracts is immaterial".
60 In a casenote on Stratford & Son Ltd. v. Lindley in (1965), 28 Modern Law
Review 205, L.W. Wedderburn speaks in terms of a considerable lowering of the hurdle
(at 206). Compare f. Square Grip Reinforcement Co. Ltd. v. Macdonald, [1968] S.L.T.
65, per Lord Milligan at 72.
61 Supra, note 51 at 324.
62, [1966] 1 W.L.R. 691.
63, [1966] 1 W.L.R. 691, at 700 to 701.
64 (1965), 99 LT.L.R. 45.
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Dublin. The plaintiffs contended that it was sufficient if the intervener could
be fixed with implied or constructive knowledge of the existence of such a
contract. Budd, J., canvassed the dicta of the Law Lords in the Stratford
case 5 and concluded that the observations in that case were "strong support
for the proposition that constructive knowledge is sufficient knowledge."(6
He added that:
In many instances in modem life it must be obvious to the ordinary onlooker
that some transaction is taking place on foot of some contract, particularly where
matters of payment and delivery are concerned. This applies a fortiori where that
intervener has special knowledge of the course of dealing, the customs prevailing
and the surrounding circumstance;0 7
Budd, J., was satisfied on the evidence presented in the interlocutory pro-
ceedings before him that the plaintiffs had made out a sufficient prima facie
case as to the knowledge of the defendants. They could scarcely have thought
that the timber came to the plaintiffs like "manna from heaven".
There is little doubt in my mind that it should on principle be open
to a plaintiff to rely on constructive knowledge to satisfy the knowledge re-
quirement necessary for the imposition of tort liability. As the courts are
prepared to impose liability where the defendant has acted recklessly or dis-
played a "quasi-intention", 8 a state of mind which the court may have to
infer from the facts, there would seem to be no good reason- why the courts
should not impose the knowledge requirement upon the defendant by using
constructive knowledge.
In view of the fact that the Canadian courts have willingly held that it
is not necessary to have knowledge of the precise terms of the contract, they
should have little difficulty accepting that constructive knowledge of the
contract itself will suffice.
(ii) The time of knowledge.
A second problem has arisen in relation to the knowledge requirement,
namely, what is the crucial time at which the defendant must possess knowl-
edge? Is it necessary for the defendant to have knowledge (or for the court-
to be able to say he had constructive knowledge) at the time when he first
made the inconsistent contract, or will it be sufficient that he acquired knowl-
edge of the contract at a later time, either before the contract was finally
executed (i.e. in the case of an executory contract) or even after the contract
had become executed? The case law on this point is sparse.
In D.C. Thompson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin,69 Jenkins, L.J., indicated that:
"The inconsistent dealing between the third party and the contract breaker
may, indeed, be commenced without knowledge by the third party of the
05, [1965] A.C. 269.
OOSupra, note 64.
07 (1965), 99 I.T.L.R. 45, at 54.
08 Seo British Industrial Plastics Ltd. v. Ferguson, [1940] 1 All E.R. 479 (H.L.);
and Jones Brothers (Hunstanton) Ltd. v. Stevens, [1955] 1 Q.B. 275.
09, [1952] 1 Ch. 646.
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contract thus broken; but, if it is continued after the third party has notice
of the contract, an actionable interference has been committed by him". 70
Support for this broad generalisation can be found in the master and
servant cases. 71 For example, in Jones Brothers (Hunstanton) Ltd. v.
Stevens, 72 Lord Goddard, C.J., concluded that: "There can be no question
.. . that it is actionable to continue to employ the servant of another after
notice, though the person so continuing to employ the servant did not pro-
cure him to leave his master or know when he engaged him that he was the
servant of another."78 Unfortunately the dictum is weakened by the fact that
the plaintiff employer's claim was in fact disallowed on the ground that, as
the employee would not, if released, have returned to his former employ-
ment, it could not be shown that the plaintiff had suffered any damage. At
most, therefore, the case provided some judicial support for the obiter
remarks of Jenkins, L.J.
In view of the fact that the "Jenkins Principle" cannot be supported by
strong authority, it would seem desirable to examine it closely before drawing
any final conclusions. Indeed, unless the principle can be justified on some
special ground connected with the master-servant relationship (for example,
the promotion of stable employment conditions), 74 it would appear to be
inequitable to impose liability in tort on a second employer who only learns
of the inconsistent employment contract after he has secured a contract with
the servant, especially if the court could not find that at the time he nego-
tiated the inconsistent contract he did not even have the constructive knowl-
edge of the earlier contract. Furthermore, in releasing the servant, the second
employer may (depending on the terms of his contract with the servant) be
forced into committing a breach of contract himself.
The issue under consideration has been the subject of litigation in the
case of H.C. Sleigh Ltd. v. Blight."5 The facts showed that one Bishop had
entered into a contract with Blight for the purchase of a service station, in
complete ignorance of any trading agreement between Blight and the plaintiff
oil company. After the purchase contract had been executed, Bishop became
aware of an earlier agreement whereby Blight had undertaken to purchase all
petroleum supplies from Sleigh Ltd. and not to sell the business to a pur-
chaser without the consent of the plaintiff. However, Bishop went ahead and
took possession of the service station under the purchase contract despite
the earlier agreement. Furthermore, he refused to enter into a supply agree-
ment with the oil company.
70 Id. at 694.
71 Blake v. Lanyon (1795), 6 Term Rep. 221; De Francesco v. Barnum (1890), 45
Ch. D. 430; Fred Wilkins & Brothers Ltd. v. Weaver, [1915] 2 Ch. 322.
72, [1955] 1 Q.B. 275.
73 Id. at 279.
74 It should be noted that the first employer will always have a contractual cause
of action against his former employee, and he may have an action for loss of services,
enticement or harbouring against the second employer - see Clerk & Lfndsell on Torts,
supra, note 49 at 435 et seq.
7s, [1969] V.R. 931 (Vict. S.C.).
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The plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction against the purchaser,
claiming that he was liable for inducing breach of the Sleigh-Blight agree-
ment. The difficulty faced by the plaintiff was that it could not be shown
that at the time Bishop entered into his contract with Blight, he had knowl-
edge of the earlier supply agreement. It was only later that he acquired the
vital knowledge of the inconsistent contract. The plaintiff's claim that liability
should nevertheless be imposed on the basis that, having later discovered the
agreement, Bishop elected to complete the purchase contract, was supported
by the dictum of Jenkins, L.J., 76 and the master-servant cases.7 7
In considering this claim, Adam, J., drew a distinction between two
different situations involving interference with contracts. First, he referred to
the case where the third party having no knowledge of any prior agreement
is inescapably bound by his own contract with the contract breaker. Then,
he noted the case where the third party again with no knowledge of a prior
agreement was able to refuse at his election to complete the second contract
without incurring any liability. In the former case he suggested it would be
"anomalous" if by performance of binding contractual obligations he in-
curred liability in tort to a stranger just because he subsequently acquired
knowledge of the prior agreement.
However, he added:
In the latter case where the third party is entitled to repudiate his contract,
without liability, there is no doubt more to be said, as it would be from his own
election to continue on with the contract, despite the knowledge which he had
acquired, that he would have interfered with another's contractual rights.7 8
The case before Adam, J., waA of the second variety. The judge had held
that the defendant Bishop had the right to rescind for misrepresentation,"
and thus was in a position to elect whether to exercise that right or proceed
with his contract. Nevertheless, even though the defendant clearly had knowl-
edge of the prior agreement at the time the election was made, it was held
that he was not liable for inducing breach of contract. The Court appeared
to hold that in neither of the two situations outlined above should liability
in tort be imposed. In the first case: "on what rational principle is [the de-
fendant] to be denied his contractual rights to insist on completion of his own
contract?"8 0 And Adam J. added that, even in the second case:
on principle it should make no difference . .. that his contract may happen to
be voidable by him. After all, a voidable contract is valid and enforceable unless
and until avoided at the election of a party entitled to avoid it, and why should
it be considered an unlawful act on his part if, preferring his own contractual
rights, he elects to affirm the contract rather than forego them for the benefit
70 In D.C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Keakin, [1952] 1 Ch. 646, quoted supra, text at
note 69.
7 7 Supra, note 71.
78, [1969] V.R. 931 at 936.
70 The judge concluded that Bishop could have rescinded the contract despite the
fact that the contract had been executed. Sed quaere whether the right of rescission had
been lost by virtue of the operation of the doctrine of merger? For a discussion of this
issue, see L.L. Stevens, The Role of the Doctrine of Merger in Contracts for the Sale
of Land - The Canadian Experience (1973), 8 U.B.C. Law Rev. 35.
80, [1969] V.R. 931 at 936.
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of another? In the conflict in such a case between the third party's own con-
tractual rights lawfully acquired, and those of the plaintiff, on what principle are
the contractual rights of the plaintiff to be preferred, and the third party's action
in asserting his own contractual rights to be deemed as unlawful acts?81
In finding for the defendant, the judge refused to accept the proposition
of Jenkins, L.J. previously cited. The decision in Sleigh Ltd. v. Blight has
recently been criticised 2 on the ground that no adequate case was made out
for rejecting the Jenkins principle. What is more, the decision, it has been
said, gives "no weight to the fact that the plaintiffs made their contract
first".8 3 However, it is suggested that neither the view of Jenkins, L.J., nor
the view of Adam, J., is entirely correct. Each is an extreme approach,
whereas what is required in this difficult situation is a compromise approach
based on the issue of whether the second contract maker has any real free-
dom of choice whether to proceed with his second inconsistent contract. The
principle contended for is that liability in tort should be imposed on a de-
fendant if, in the exercise of a free choice whether to proceed or withdraW
from an inconsistent contract, he chose to proceed rather than withdraw.
This approach necessitates a close examination of the legal effects of the
second contract.
This method of resolving cases where knowledge is acquired after the
entering into of a second contract can be illustrated with reference to five
different factual situations. First, there is the situation where A contracts with
B. C without actual or constructive knowledge of the A-B contract, pro-
ceeds to execute a contract with B. As a result of this second inconsistent
contract B is forced to break off his contract with A, but C, according to
the terms of the second contract, has no way of escaping from his obliga-
tions to B, without breaking this second contract. If A sues C in tort, claim-
ing that C induced B to break his contract with A, the question is whether A
should succeed if C only learns of the prior inconsistent contract after
his contract with B has been finalised?
It is suggested that A should not succeed. The result of providing A
with a cause of action would force C, an innocent contract maker, into
breaching his contract on the sole basis that A had contracted with B first. It
would provide A with a second possible cause of action, over and above his
normal contractual rights against B. It seems manifestly unjust to allow C
to be sued in tort, when, due to his total lack of knowledge, he had no real
freedom of choice whether to continue his contract with B. Any failure to
perform his obligations would render him liable in contract to B.
A similar result should obtain where C acquires knowledge of the prior
inconsistent contract, before the second contract is executed, if, but only if,
C has no basis on which to withdraw from his second contract without being
held to be in breach of contract. The important point is to examine the
second agreement to ascertain whether C had any real choice whether to
proceed or not.
81 Id.
8 2 See P.M. North, Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law (1971) at 518.
83 Id. at 520.
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A third variation would arise if the second contract provided C with a
right of rescission. This is precisely the same situation as was before Adam, J.,
in Sleigh Ltd. v. Blight,84 where C had specifically asked B whether there
was any prior inconsistent contract. When it turned out that there was a
prior agreement, this very fact furnished C with a right to terminate. He,
therefore, had a choice as to whether to proceed with the second contract
or not. If he had withdrawn, he would not have been in breach of his agree-
ment with B. Should A have been able to recover against C in tort?
If one applied the freedom of choice test, the answer would be in the
affirmative. If a person, with a real choice on the question of whether to
proceed or withdraw from contractual relations, decides to proceed and in
so doing causes injury to another, liability should follow. Adam, J., con-
sidered that the opposite conclusion was justified on the ground that the
second "voidable contract was valid and enforceable unless and until
avoided", 85 but this conclusion would seem to ignore the point that legal
rights are being interfered with by the deliberate and conscious act of an
albeit formerly innocent contract maker. At the time when the vital election
is made, C has ceased to be innocent, in that he has acquired knowledge of
the prior contract. The basis for choosing the rights of the first contract maker
is that his rights are being destroyed by someone who has a choice of
whether to act or not. In the conflict between A and C, it is submitted that
the prevention of deliberate incursions upon the rights of others is a valid
reason for preferring the claim of A to that of C.
Admittedly, the case for preferring the rights of A is weakened if C
fortuitously finds that he has some ground, perhaps on some entirely col-
lateral matter, for terminating his contract with B. Should he still be sub-
jected to tortious liability to A? If one makes freedom of choice (upon the
receipt of knowledge) the crucial test, the answer should be in the affirma-
tive. The fact that C has fortuitously acquired some right to terminate the
contract cannot detract from the point that if he elects to continue with his
agreement with B, he will by his own choice have deliberately inflicted harm
on A. Liability in tort should follow.80 A further difficulty could arise if C
did not in fact know that he had a right to rescind or terminate his contract
with B. It is submitted that, unless C is aware of his rights (or is made aware
of them by A), he has no real freedom of choice. In the absence of knowl-
edge of one of the alternatives of his choice, C should not be penalised for
deliberately interfering with A's rights.
A further variation to the fact pattern would arise where C executes a
second inconsistent contract with B, and the agreement contains a provision
enabling C to bring it to an end upon, say, one day's or one week's notice,
If during the currency of this contract C acquires knowledge of a prior in-
consistent contract between A and B, could he be said to be exercising a
freedom of choice if he chose not to implement the notice provision? At first
84, [1969] V.R. 931 (Vict. S.C.).
85, [1969] V.R. 931 at 936.
80 This is, of course, assuming that all the other requirements for the tort of in-
ducing breach of contract can be met.
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glance, it appears that an affirmative answer is the correct one. This might
explain the decisions in the three master-servant cases mentioned earlier, 7
although it is only speculation in that the reports do not contain any indica-
tion as to the presence or absence of a notice provision. However, if the
notice provision required a longer period of notice, further difficulties arise.
It is submitted that the courts should do nothing to force the second
contract maker into the position where he is in breach of his own contract.
Consequently, if a notice provision provided for one year's notice, a
court should not hold C liable in tort unless he refused to exercise his notice
rights. An order which would have the effect of restoring A's rights in one
year's time might be of little solace to A,88 but at least it would be consistent
with the freedom of choice test suggested as a means of mitigating the two
extreme views taken in the cases to date.
The approach contended for here places great weight on an analysis of
the second contract as a means of ascertaining whether C had any real free-
dom of choice in relation to his interference with A's contractual interests.
Surely this is fairer than the all-or-nothing result produced by the two ap-
proaches hitherto outlined by the courts.
B. The Intention Requirement
In order to succeed in an inducing breach of contract action, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant intended to cause injury to the
plaintiff's pecuniary interests by bringing about a breach of contract.8 9 Per-
haps the most concise statement of the intention requirement in the Canadian
cases was made by McRuer, CJ.H.C. in Dewar v. Dwan:90
The intention to injure the plaintiffs is an essential element... in order that it
may be actionable. Evidence which merely shows that acts were done, whetherlawful or unlawful, which resulted in a breach of contract does not give rise
to a cause of action for inducing breach of contract. It must be shown that the
intended purpose of the acts was to bring about a breach of contract 9'
The courts have consistently refused to lower this requirement to a point
where recovery would be allowed for a negligent interference with con-
tractual rights. There is a long line of case authority dating back to Cattle v.
Stockton Waterworks Co.9 2 illustrating the rule that where negligent conduct
causes interference with contractual relations, liability will not be imposed.93
87 Supra, note 71.
88 The result would be that the courts were refraining from protecting the first con-
tract maker unless he suffered a deliberate interference at the hands of C.89 Stott v. Gamble, [1916] 2 K.B. 504, per Horridge, J., at 508-509, citing Lord
Watson in Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C. 1, 96. See also Poister Ltd. v. Marcel Fenez Ltd.,
[19651 R.P.C. 187.
90 (1958), 11 D.L.R. (2d) 130 (Ont. H.C.).
91 Id., 133-134. For a further discussion of the intention element, see Dirasser and
James v. Kelly Douglas & Co. Ltd. (1967), 59 D.L.R. (2d) 452 (B.C.C.A.).
92 (1875), L.R. 10 Q.B. 453.
93 See also S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. WJ. Whittall & Son Ltd., [1971] 1Q.B. 337 (Eng. C.A.); Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd.,
[1973] 1 Q.B. 27 (Eng. CA.); and for a discussion of the recent Canadian authorities,
see L.L. Stevens, supra, note 5.
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The most difficult problem with the intention requirement is to ascertain
what will be regarded by the courts as sufficient to meet it. As with the
knowledge of the contract requirement, the courts have recognized that a
reckless defendant may be held liable in tort. If the plaintiff can show that
the defendant conducted himself in such a way as to interfere with the
plaintiff's contract, regardless as to whether it caused him harm or not, the
intention requirement will be held to be satisfied. Recklessness or quasi-
intention will be sufficient.94 Thus the defendant who turns a blind eye, not
to the presence of a contract or its turns, but to the question of whether the
plaintiff will be injured, may be subjected to liability in tort.95
One of the leading cases on intention is the House of Lords decision in
British Industrial Plastics Ltd. v. Ferguson. The Law Lords clearly rec-
ognised that a defendant who shut his eyes to either the presence of a con-
tract or the question of injury to the plaintiff could be liable in certain cir-
cumstances. However, no liability was imposed in that case because it
appeared on the facts that the defendants, having suspected that a manu-
facturing process did not belong to the vendor, sent the matter to their patent
agents who reported that the process was patentable. On the strength of this
report the defendants foolishly, but honestly,97 believed that the vendor was
at liberty to sell it to them. It was held that even though the defendants had
done an act which amounted to a breach of the plaintiff's contract, the fact
that they did so in the bona fide belief that no breach was involved, pre-
cluded the imposition of liability.
Quite apart from questions of recklessness, it is important to ascertain
how the courts deal with the issue of measuring the intention element in
borderline cases. We are not concerned here with cases where it is plain on
the facts that the defendant intended to cause the plaintiff injury. The diffi-
cult cases are those where the facts on the intention issue are equivocal. What
test does the court use to determine whether consequences are intentional
or not? It would be tempting to state simply that when the courts are having
difficulty with the intention issue, that resort could be had to the presumption
that a "party must be considered, in point of law, to intend that which is
the necessary or natural consequence of that which he does.198 However,
04 See Emerald Construction Co. Ltd. v. Lowthian, [1966] 1 W.L.R. 691, per Dip-
lock, LJ. at 704.
95 See Jones Brothers (Hunstanton) Ltd. v. Stevens, [1955] 1 Q.B. 275, per Lord
Goddard, C.J., at 280.
90, [1940] 1 All. E.R. 479.
97 As Lord Romer stated, the defendants' honesty was vindicated at the expense of
their intelligence. "Their stupidity consisted in not realising that the patent agents would
concern themselves solely with the question of anticipation by existing patents, and
would not concern themselves with any question of want of subject-matter owing to
prior user." Id. at 483.
98 R. v. Harvey (1823), 2 B. & C. 257, 264. The presumption is commonly used
in the criminal law, but also has application in the law of torts. See Winfield and Jolowicz
on Tort, supra, note 1 at 24. For a consideration of the application of the presumption
in the torts of assault, battery, etc. see JJ. Atrens, "Intentional Interference with the
Person", in A. Linden, ed. Studies in Canadian Tort Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1968)
at 378 et seq.
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there have been a number of statements in the cases and textbooks alike
which raise doubts about the validity of this approach. For example, it is
stated in Fleming 9 that a defendant must have acted "with a view to bring-
ing about a [breach of contract, and] counselled action designed to achieve
that end". There is a footnote reference which reads: "That it was the
'natural and probable' consequence is not enough."'0
There appears to be no reason in principle why the courts should not
avail themselves of this presumption to resolve borderline cases, nor do the
leading English cases suggest that there is any rule to the contrary. The most
notable Canadian decision which can be cited as authority against the use
of the presumption is Dirassar and James v. Kelly Douglas & Co. Ltd.'01
The case concerned an alleged inducement of breach of contract by the de-
fendants Kelly Douglas, who, as financial backers of certain developers, had
exercised foreclosure rights against the developers and so interfered with the
contractual relationship between the developers and the plaintiff architects. A
majority of the Court of Appeal held that the defendants were not liable in
tort on the grounds that there was no wrongful procurement, neither did the
defendant intend to inflict harm on the architects. Norris, l.A., dissented,
principally because he took a different view of the facts as they related to
(a) the wrongful procurement and (b) the question of intention.
For present purposes, the important point is to ascertain what the court
decided on the applicability of the presumption when considering the inten-
tion issue. This was a case where it was extremely difficult to tell whether
the defendants possessed the necessary intention or not. Was the court en-
titled to use the presumption to help resolve this point? The judgments of the
majority judges suggest a negative answer: MacLean, J.A. considered and
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that: "it was sufficient for the plaintiffs' pur-
poses if the alleged resulting damage was the natural and probable conse-
quence of the act."'1 2 He referred for support to the dictum of Upjohn J. in
the Thompson case that the "fact that the natural and probable consequences
of that act is that [the company] may be compelled to break their contracts
with the plaintiffs is not sufficient to constitute the tort alleged."'1 3 Branca,
J.A. also considered this point and appeared to reject the applicability of the
presumption, although his conclusion was simply that there was no evidence
of intention to interfere with the plaintiffs' contract. 04
The minority judge, Norris, J.A., took a different view on the question
of proof of intention. He was clearly of the opinion that in appropriate cir-
99 Fleming at 608.
100 See note 14. A number of cases are cited in support of this proposition. These
will be considered shortly.
101 (1967), 59 D.L.R. (2d) 452. (B.C.C.A.). A number of other cases contain
dicta on this topic, e.g. Dewar v. Dwan (1958), 11 D.L.R. (2d) 130, per McRuer,
C.JH.C. at 134, relying on Stott v. Gamble, [1916] 2 K.B. 504.
102 (1967), 59 D.L.R. (2d) 452, 488.
103, [19521 1 Ch. 646 at 663.
104 (1966), 59 D.L.R. (2d) 452 at 506.
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cumstances it was open to the court to use the presumption.105 The learned
judge drew support for this conclusion from several sources,106 including the
decision in Bowen v. Hall,'07 where Brett, L.J. stated that: "Whenever a man
does an act which in law and in fact is a wrongful act, and such an act as
may as a natural and probable consequence of it produce injury to another,
and which in the particular case does produce such an injury, an action on
the case will lie." Not only did Norris, J.A., accept that the intention ele-
ment could be proved in this way, but he also held that the presumption stood
unrefuted on the evidence in the instant case.
Was Norris, L.A., correct as to the use of the presumption? It is sub-
mitted that court should be free to employ the presumption where the facts
are unclear. It is stated by Street'0 8 that:
If the defendant does an act the substantially certain consequence of which is to
bring about a breach of a contract of which he is aware, then he will be pre-
sumed to have intended it, and be held liable unless the presumption
is rebutted.109
The purpose of using the presumption is to help the court, faced with a need
to fulffi the intention requirement, to surmount an impasse where the evi-
dence is equivocal. What is more, the presumption is rebuttable," 0 and it
is open to the defendant to adduce evidence which indicates that there was
no intention to injure."' It appears that the Dirassar case 12 has been the
source of considerable confusion. In the writer's view, the case should not be
interpreted as denying the courts the opportunity of using the presumption
as a means of assisting them to reach a conclusion in difficult cases. The
result of the case may well have been correct, but the majority reached that
result by somewhat unsatisfactory means.
105 Id. at 473.
100 For example, the judgment of Blackburn, J., in R. v. Hicklin (1868), L.R. 3
Q.B. 360 at 365, where it was said that: "I take the rule of law to be, as stated by
Lord Ellenborough in Rex. v. Dixon (1814), 3 M.&S. 11, in the shortest and clearest
manner: 'It is a universal principle that when a man is charged with doing an act [that
is a wrongful act, without any legal justification] of which the probable consequence
may be highly injurious, the intention is an inference of law resulting from the doing
of the act.1" Also, South Wales Miner's Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co. Ltd., [1905]
A.C. 239 (H.L.) Per Lord James, at 250.
107 (1881), 6 Q.B.C. 33.
108 Harry Street, The Law of Torts (5th ed. London: Butterworths, 1972).
100 Id. 339. See also, Salmond on Torts, supra, note 50, at 496 ("It is enough to
show that the defendant did an act which must damage the plaintiff: it need not be
proved that he intended to do so.").
110 Exchange Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. Gregory & Co., [1896] 1 Q.B. 147; White v.
Riley, [1921] 1 Ch. 1; National Phonograph Co. Ltd. v. Edison-Bell Phonograph Co.
Ltd., [1908] 1 Ch. 335, per Lord Alverstone, CJ., at 357.
. M In the same way as it is open to the defendant where the court is considering
reckless conduct, to lead evidence to prove the contrary. See British Industrial Plastics
Ltd. v. Ferguson, [1940] 1 All E.R. 479; and Emerald Construction Co. Ltd. v.
Lowthian, [1966] 1 W.L.R. 691.
112 Supra, note 101.
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C. Breach of an Existing Contract
It has generally been considered that one of the prerequisites to liability
for inducing breach of contract is a breach of a "valid and enforceable con-
tract by the defendant"." 8 Recently this requirement has been the subject of
much judicial scrutiny, and two separate parts of the requirement must be
examined in the light of a nunmber of decisions. First, reference will be made
to the decisions dealing with the need for a valid and enforceable contract and
secondly, the rule requiring a breach of contract will be considered.
(i) Valid and enforceable contracts.
It is clear that no tort is committed where the contract which has
allegedly been breached as a result of the defendant's conduct is void. Various
illustrations of void contracts being a bar to recovery in tort can be cited,
including contracts void on the ground of a mistake of identity of one of the
contracting parties," 4 or void as being a gaming or wagering contract,"r
or void on account of the incapacity of one of the parties,"16 or void as being
an unreasonable restraint of trade." 7 In relation to the restraint of trade
cases, the severance doctrine may be applied to save certain reasonable con-
tracts or parts thereof, and consequently, liability in tort may follow if the
defendant has procured a breach of the valid portion of the contract."18
The question of voidable contracts is more difficult. If one of the parties
has already taken steps to avoid the obligations under the contract, no liability
in tort should flow in respect of any act after the time of avoidance. But if
the contract is valid and subsisting (although voidable) when the interference
takes place, it appears that liability in tort may be imposed."19 Presumably
a similar result should follow where the contract is voidable on some other
ground, for example, certain types of mistake. If the party holding the right
to avoid has chosen not to exercise his right, 20 and a third party has induced
13Posluns v. Toronto Stock Exchange (1965), 46 D.L.R. (2d) 210 (Ont. H.C.);
and Northern Messenger (Calgary) Ltd. v. Frost (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 436 (Alta.
S.C.); see also McKernan v. Fraser (1931), 46 C.L.R. 343 (High Ct. of Aust.).
14 Said v. Butt, [19201 3 K.B. 497, where the sale of a theatre ticket was found
not to constitute a contract on account of a material mistake concerning the identity of
the purchaser. For a discussion of mistakes which render a contract void, see G. Treitel,
The Law of Contract (3d ed. London: Stevens, 1970) at 238 et seq.
1 5 Joe Lee Ltd. v. Lord Dalmeny, [1927] 1 Ch. 300.
116 De Francesco v. Barnum (1890), 45 Ch. D. 430.
"7 Northern Messenger (Calgary) Ltd. v. Frost (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 456.
318 Id. Where the doctrine of severance was applied to save certain delivery con-
tracts, liability in tort was imposed in respect of breaches of these contracts procured
by the defendants.
"9 Keene v. Boycott (1795), 2 H.BI. 511. There, a contract of service between
the plaintiff and his infant's option, and, in holding the defendant liable in tort, the
court indicated that it was not open to the defendant to take advantage of the infant's
right of avoidance.
320 Or has not yet had the opportunity to exercise that right (e.g. on account of
unawareness of the mistake giving rise to the right).
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a breach of the contract, it seems that in principle liability should be
imposed.'-"
The situation where the contract is voidable on the basis that it is an
unconscionable transaction122 is more complex. If the unconscionable contract
is subsisting when a third party intervenes, considerable differences may arise
in the disposition of the tort action depending on who was induced to breach
the contract, and in what circumstances. If the perpetrator of the uncon-
scionable bargain was induced to break the contract, it would be unlikely
that any action would be commenced by the sufferer of the unconscionability.
For one thing, it is doubtful that any damage would have been caused -
indeed the sufferer might have gained from the contract breaker's action. If
the innocent party was induced to breach the contract, the question of whether
the plaintiff could succeed in a tort action would be determined by the cir-
cumstances surrounding the inducement. If the innocent party had been ad-
vised by friends, or a solicitor to take advantage of his legal rights to rescind
the unconscionable bargain, no liability should be imposed.123 But if the de-
fendant was an independant third party, in a position to profit from bringing
the earlier contract to an end, the courts might well hesitate before rejecting
the plaintiff's claim.12 4
Further difficulties arise where there has been an induced breach of a
contract unenforceable by action. An example of this is where the require-
ments of the Statute of Frauds have not been met. Should a defendant be
liable in tort for inducing a breach of an unenforceable contract? There is
Canadian authority indicating a negative answer to this question. In Brown v.
Spamberger-r a defendant purchaser of real estate had advised the vendor
that his commission contract with the real estate agent was unenforceable 2 6
as there was no written agreement. As a result, the vendor agreed to sell the
property at a substantially reduced price, thus benefitting the defendant. The
agent sued the purchaser for inducing breach of contract, but it was held by
a majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal that the defendant was not liable
in tort.
It is interesting to note that only one judge decided the case on the
ground that the defendant had induced a breach of an unenforceable agree-
121 Whether it was the plaintiff or the other party to the contract who held the
right to avoid the contract should be irrelevant, so long as the contract has not yet been
avoided.
122 Morrison v. Coast Finance Ltd. (1966), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 710 (B.C.C.A.); noted
in (1966), 44 Can. Bar Rev. 142 (B. Crawford).
123Knupp v. Bell (1966), 58 D.L.R. (2d) 466 (Sask. Q.B.). From the point of
view of tort liability, such defendants might well be able to plead justification in the
event that all other requirements of the tort had been met. Although it is doubtful
whether there has been any breach of contract.
124 Compare Brown v. Spamberger and Bunting (1960), 21 D.L.R. (2d) 630
(Ont. C.A.).
125 Id.
126By virtue of then section 39 of The Real Estate and Business Brokers Act,
R.S.O. 1950, c. 332.
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ment.127 The other majority judge, McGillivray, J.A., decided that there was
evidence on which the court would find that the defendant induced or pro-
cured a breach of contract.' 28 There was a very strong dissent by LeBel, J.A.
In his view, the mere fact that the commission agreement was not in writing
(and hence unenforceable by action) did not make it any less of a valid and
legal contract, imposing a legal obligation or duty on the vendor to pay the
commission. He indicated that the result of the defendant's argument would
be that one could interfere with another's known contractual rights so long as
there is nothing in writing to evidence the contract. He added: "That strikes
me as a rather novel and startling proposition. I am not aware of any author-
ity which supports it. It also amounts to the assertion that a stranger to a
contract is entitled to rely on section 39 [of the Real Estate and Business
Brokers Act] as a defence to an action that does not lie in contract. In my
opinion neither of these propositions is sound in law."' 2 9
Direct support for the view of the minority judge is to be found in
Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort.8 0 The authors claim that it should be action-
able to procure a breach of a valid but unenforceable contract, and add that
the action is not "an indirect method of enforcing the contract against the
other contracting party but is against a third party and in tort."' 8 ' The plaintiff
is being provided with redress by the law for an independent wrong per-
petrated by the defendant. 22
There appears to be no sound reason in principle why an unenforceable
contract should not provide the foundation for an action for procuring breach.
Like the voidable contract, it is in certain circumstances a valid legal under-
taking remaining on foot to allow the voluntary performance by the party
entitled either to avoid or to resist its enforcement. Any interference amount-
ing to breach by a third person in either of these situations should be action-
able in tort. This conclusion has not been willingly accepted by the Canadian
courts. Yet, it has not been questioned by the American courts, as illustrated
in the following passage from Prosser:
The law of course does not object to the voluntary performance of agreements
merely because it will not enforce them, and it indulges in the assumption that
even unenforceable promises will be carried out if no third person interferes.
Accordingly, it usually is held that contracts which are voidable by reason of the
statute of frauds, formal defects, lack of consideration, lack of mutuality, or even
uncertainty of terms, or harsh and unconscionable provisions, or conditions pre-
cedent to the existence of the obligation, can still afford a basis for a tort action
when the defendant interferes with their performance.38
127 See the judgment of Roach, J.A. (1969), 21 DJL.R. (2d) at 632.
128Id. at 641.
129 ld. at 635-636.
18 o Supra, note 1 at 455.
131 Id.
'
8 2 For further indirect support for this view, see Austin v. Olsen (1868), LR. 3
Q.B. 308, especially the judgment of Mellor, J., at p. 211. (No defense to the criminal
offence of persuading a seaman to break an engagement to plead that the engagement
did not comply with all the necessary statutory formalities).
iaa Prosser on Torts, supra, note 8 at 955-956.
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The Canadian courts would do well to consider this approach before applying
the majority decision in Brown v. Spamberger34 to other situations involving
voidable or unenforceable contracts.
In connection with the "valid and enforceable contract" requirement,
the courts have held that the fact that the party induced to break the contract
had an option to terminate the contract in certain events will provide no solace
to the defendant who procured the breach. 35 Such a defendant will have no
defence simply by showing that a termination option was reserved in the
original contract. He must show that the induced party terminated his con-
tractual obligations lawfully (e.g. by the exercise of a notice provision). But
if the defendant produces the conditions required to bring an available option
into play, with the intention of bringing the contract to an end, he will have
committed an actionable wrong.'36 In these circumstances the contract can-
not be said to have been lawfully terminated and will be treated as having
been breached in the same way as if the breach had been caused by a more
direct method.
It will always be important to scrutinise the original contract to ensure
that a binding contract has been formed. The situation might arise where
there was no contract due to the presence of a condition precedent.3 7 A court
might however characterize the condition as a condition subsequent, 38 in
which case a binding contract would exist.
Another reason for scrutinising the original contract is to ascertain the
effect of any exception clause. If such a clause is so wide as to prevent the
creation of contractual obligations, there will be no contract to provide the
foundation of liability in tort. As is indicated by one writer 39 "the exception
would affect primary rights and duties by preventing their accrual". If no
obligations accrue, the plaintiff will be in exactly the same position as if the
contract were void: there would be no basis for liability.
It might well be that the particular exception clause will not be inter-
preted as having such a devastating effect on the agreement. The clause,
rather than precluding the formation of a contract, might simply operate to
render particular types of breaches not actionable in certain circumstances,
leaving unaffected the substratum of the contract. 40 However, the important
point is that the original contract must be carefully analysed to determine the
exact nature of the obligations undertaken and the scope of any exceptions
thereto.
134 (1960), 21 D.L.R. (2d) 630 (Ont. C.A.).
185 See Emerald Construction Co. Ltd. v. Lowthian, [1966] 1 WJ..R. 691; and
Square Grip Reinforcement Co. Ltd. v. Macdonald (No. 2) [1968] S.L.T. 65.
130 This principle is confirmed by Lord Denning, M.R., in Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd.
v. Cousins, [1969] 2 Ch. 106, 38, citing New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Sociitd des
Ateliers et Chantiers de France, [1919] A.C.1.
'87 See Treitel, supra, note 114 at 55.
13 8 See the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Fabbi v. Jones (1972), 28
DLR. (3d) 224.
189 B. Coote, Exception Clauses (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1964) at 148.
140 See Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Cousins, [1969] 2 Ch. 106 (Eng. C.A.). And for
a discussion of this point, see Clerk & Lindsell, supra, note 49 at 383-384.
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(ii) Breach or interference - the emergence of a new tort.
As noted earlier, one of the prerequisites for liability in the tort of
inducing breach of contract is that the defendant must procure or induce a
breach of the contract. 141 It may be that one of the parties to the original
contract retains a right to determine the contract, for example, upon giving
appropriate notice. The defendant will commit no wrong if he induces the
party holding that right to exercise it, for no breach will have been induced.
However, it is not open for the defendant to argue that he has merely caused a
suspension of the contractual obligations. Any material alteration to the
contract caused by the defendant will be tantamount to breach and it will not
avail the defendant to attempt to characterize this as a temporary
suspension. 142
Difficulties have arisen where it has not been possible to characterise
the consequences as a "breach" of contract. Can liability be imposed where
there has merely been a "prevention" or "hindering" of the performance of
the contract? Recent dicta in the English courts indicate a negative answer.143
However, there is some support for the contrary view. For example, Lord
Denning, M.R., believes that the question has not finally been determined. 44
He has opined that "some would.., hold that it is unlawful for a third per-
son deliberately and directly to interfere with the execution of a contract, even
though he does not cause any breach.' 45
The first direct support for a tort of interference short of breach came
from the Master of the Rolls in Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Cousins.146 In his
view the decision in that case could have been reached on the basis of tort
liability imposed on a person preventing or hindering the plaintiff in the per-
formance of his contract. He claimed that: "The time has come when the
principle should be further extended to cover deliberate and direct inter-
ference with the execution of a contract without that causing any breach...
the common law would be seriously deficient if it did not condemn such
interference."1 47
Lord Denning then proceeded to outline the three elements of this tort.
First, the plaintiff must show that there has been an interference in the
141 See D.C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin, [1952] Ch. 646, 702. See also Posluns
v. Toronto Stock Exchange (1965), 46 D.L.R. (2d) 210, per Gale, J., at 262.
142 See Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd. v. Gardner, [1968] 2 Q.B. 762 (Eng. CA.).
148 See iT. Stratford & Son Ltd. v. Lindley, [1965] A.C. 269. Especially the dictum
of Lord Donovan at 340 ("the argument that there is a tort consisting of some un-
definable interference with business contracts, I find as novel and surprising as I think
the members of this House who decided Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tween Ltd. v.
Veitch, [1942] A.C. 435 would have done".) This view was confirmed by Fenton Atkin-
son, J., in F. Bowles & Sons Ltd. v. Lindley, [1965] 1 L.I.L. Rep. 207, especially at 212.
See also Brekkes Ltd. v. Cattel, [1972] 1 Ch. 105, per Pennycuick, V.-C., at 114.
144 Emerald Construction Co. Ltd. v. Lowthian, [1966] 1 W.L.R. 691.
145 ld. at 701.
146, [19691 2 Ch. 106.
147 Id. at 138. For a recent English decision adopting this dictum, see Esso Petro-
leum Co. Ltd. v. Kingswood Motors Ltd., [1973] 3 All E.R. 1057.
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execution of a contract. Such interference is not confined to cases of breach,
but extends to cases "where a third party prevents or hinders one party from
performing his contract, even though it be not a breach". 148 Secondly, the
interference must be deliberate or intentional: this requirement could be
satisfied either by intentional or reckless conduct. Finally, the interference
must be direct. Indirect interference such as "cornering the market" or calling
a strike on proper notice will not result in liability.149
The problem immediately arises of ascertaining the scope of what is
essentially a new tort. Before considering this question, reference should be
made to a Canadian decision which appeared to apply the principle enunciated
by Lord Denning - the first time the principle has been used as the essential
ground for imposing liability in tort. In Einhorn v. Westmount Investments
Ltd.50 the three defendants controlled two companies, including Westmount
which had entered into a contract with Einhom. It was alleged that the de-
fendants, by transferring to the second company all the valuable assets of
Westmount, made it impossible for Westmount to fulfil its contractual ob-
ligations to the plaintiff. The defendants failed in their application to strike
out the action, as the court held that the facts revealed that there had been an
interference with the contract. Disberry, J., held that he was not precluded
from finding in favour of the plaintiff by the rule that a servant acting bona
fide within the scope of his authority was exempt from liability.' 5' The fact
that no breach of contract was procured was no bar to the action. Liability
could be imposed on the basis of the principles outlined by Lord Denning in
the Torquay Hotel case. The fact that the siphoning off of the assets had
merely hindered and delayed the performance of Westmount's contract with
Einhorn was also no reason for holding against the plaintiff.
It is important to emphasize that no decision on the merits of the case
was rendered at this point. The decision was merely as to whether to allow
the defendant's motion to strike the statement of claim for failing to disclose
a cause of action. While judges are notoriously reluctant to grant such re-
quests and while there would thus be some doubt as to the precedential value
of this decision, the judgment is noteworthy if for no other reason than
Disberry Ps apparent acceptance of the "interference doctrine."
There can be no doubt that a fair result was reached on the facts of the
case, but the question remains as to the scope of the new tort. One com-
mentator has argued against even a limited application of the tort: "might
it not be better, after all, to return for now to the English common law?.'' x52
148Id. There is also support for this "new tort" in the judgment of Winn, LJ., (at
147) but it is made clear that this is not part of the ratio decidendi of the case. In
Brekkes v. Cattel, 11972] 1 Ch. 105, Pennycuick, V.-C., seems to have considered that
the new tort was clearly established by the Court of Appeal decision in the Torquay
Hotel case, but, as pointed out by D.M. Kloss, Note in (1971), 34 Modem Law Review
590 at 691, this was certainly not the ratio of the case.
140, [1969] 2 Ch. 106 at 138.
150 (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 71 (Sask. Q.B.).
151 Any rule to this effect was "swept aside almost peremptorily". See the criticisms
of K. NV. Wedderbum, Note (1970), 33 Modem Law Review 309-310.
152 Id. at 313.
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The main reasons for that writer taking a cautious stand are, first, doubts as
to the limits of the tort,153 and second, doubts as to the ability of the English
and Canadian courts to handle questions of privilege, justification and just
cause which must necessarily accompany a developing tort of this nature.'5
In relation to the first objection, the question is whether the tort will
go as far as imposing liability on a defendant who has merely persuaded a
party to a contract to exercise a right to terminate which may be available to
him. Most commentators would restrict the tort to interferences which induce
frustration or impossibility of performance. 55 However, the eventual scope
of the tort may not be of major significance, provided that the Canadian and
English courts realise that any extension of liability must also be accompanied
by a development in the grounds of justification available to the defendants.
The American courts have had little difficulty reaching the position that "any
conduct which is intended to and which in fact makes performance more
onerous is, unless privileged, a tort against the promisor". 15 The Canadian
courts could well follow the lead of the American courts on this point.
The second doubt relates to the underdevelopment of the common law
concept of justification. One reason for the narrowness of the concept in
English law is that the prima facie tort doctrine has never been embraced as
a principle of the common law. Another is that, in those torts where justifica-
tion is an integral part, it has been possible to dispose of many of the cases
without detailed consideration of this element of the tort.r 7 But this is not to
say that the common law judges do not have the capacity to apply and de-
velop concepts of privilege, justification, or just cause, should the occasion
and necessity arise. Indeed, it would seem that the common law has spun a
number of individual threads in relation to the justification of the economic
torts, and there seems to be no good reason why it should not, given the
opportunity, develop a broader and more flexible doctrine of justification.'5 8
Presumably, one way of spurring the development of such a doctrine would
be for the common law to continue to develop the tort of interference with
contractual relations short of breach: defendants and the judges would do
the rest.
III CAUSING LOSS BY UNLAWFUL MEANS
If interference short of breach is not sufficient to render the defendant
liable in tort, such interference will certainly found liability where unlawful
153Id. at 310, ("Just when and how far can a party take deliberate commercial
action for his own ends which he knows will make it more difficult, or perhaps impos-
sible, for a rival trader to pay off a debt to a creditor. .. ?").
'54 Id. at 312. The American courts by comparison have had much wider experi-
ence in handling this "armoury of conceptual weapons".
155 Wedderburn, supra, note 151, at p. 310; Clerk & Lindsell, supra, note 50 at 386;
and Winfield & Jolowicz, supra, note 1 at 455.
156 See Harper & James, Law of Torts, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1956) Vol. I at
499-500.
157 Either the case has been dismissed on account of an absence of one of the
other requirements, or liability has been imposed and it has been plain that the de-
fendant's conduct is beyond justification.
158 Compare, J.D. Heydon, Economic Torts, supra, note 21 at 177.
1974]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
or illegal means are employed by the defendant. Several nominate torts have
in the past been used to allow plaintiffs to recover where economic loss is
caused by unlawful means, for example, the torts of intimidation, conspiracy
to injure by using unlawful means, and indirect procurement of breach of
contract. More recently, there appears to be developing an innominate tort
of causing loss by unlawful means, where the threads of the separate nominate
torts have been drawn together to form one tort.
The emergence of this new tort was noted by two members of the
House of Lords in J.T. Stratford & Son Ltd. v. Lindley.159 Lord Reid and
Viscount Radcliffe both indicated that an alternative ground for imposing
liability on the respondent union officials was that they had, by unlawful means,
interfered with the business of the plaintiffs. As Lord Reid stated: "In addi-
tion to interfering with existing contracts, the respondents' action made it
practically impossible for the appellants to do any new business with barge
hirers. It was not disputed that such interference with business is tortious if
any unlawful means are employed."'160 It appears that there are four essential
ingredients to this tort of causing loss by unlawful means, or unlawful inter-
ference with trade:"0 ' (a) an intention to injure the plaintiff; (b) resultant
economic loss or interference with business relations; (c) unlawful means;
(d) an absence of justification for the conduct of the defendant.'0 2
Undoubtedly, the key to the tort is "unlawful means". Since Allen v.
Flood'63 it has not been possible at common law to impose liability in tort for
an intention to injure existing in a single person. Therefore, to prevent the new
tort falling into the category of "the leading heresy", it has been necessary
to build it around the concept of unlawful or illegal means. No liability in
tort can be imposed if the means used by a single defendant are characterised
as lawful.164
Lord Denning has again been instrumental in developing this second
new tort based on intentional infliction of economic loss.:s 5 He indicated that:
[Ijf one person deliberately interferes with the trade or business of another, and
150, [1965] A.C. 269.
100 Id. at 324. For the dictum of Viscount Radcliffe, see Id. at 328.
161 This terminology is used by Pennycuick, V.-C. in Brekkes Ltd. v. Cattel t1972]
1 Ch. 105, 114.
102 The question whether illegal means can ever be justified is a contentious one.
For a discussion of the issue see J.D. Heydon, Economic Torts, supra, note 21 at 178.
And for judicial comment on the topic, see Morgan v. Fry, [1968] 1 Q.B. 521 at 547-
548 per Widgery, J. at first instance, and, [1968] 2 Q.B. 710 at 729 per Lord
Denning, M.R.
103, [1898] A.C. 1.
164 For example, where loss is caused to a member of a trading or professional
association, by expelling the member from the association pursuant to the rules of the
association: Lee v. Showman's Guild of Great Britain, [1952] 2 Q.B. 329; Faramus v.
Film Artistes' Association, [1964] A.C. 925; and Posluns v. Toronto Stock Exchange
(1965), 46 D.L.R. (2d) 210. If the expulsion is carried out in breach of the association's
rules, then the member may have a cause of action (presumably, the member could sue
in contract): Bonsor v. Musician's Union, [1965] A.C. 104; and Edwards v. S.O.G.A.T.,
[1971] Ch. 354.
105 See Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Cousins, [1969] 2 Ch. 106.
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does so by unlawful means, that is, by an act which he is not at liberty to commit,
then he is acting unlawfully, even though he does not procure or induce any
actual breach of contract. If the means are unlawful, that is enough.1 66
The English Court of Appeal has used the tort as an alternative ground
for granting an injunction to prevent union officials operating a boycott against
newspaper publishers.167 It was held that the boycott instruction constituted
a restrictive agreement registrable under the English Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Act 1956168 and that it could not be justified by being brought within
one of the "gateway provisions" under the Act.169 Consequently, the instruc-
tion was not only in contravention of the Act, but also constituted unlawful
means for the purposes of the tort of intentionally interfering with the pub-
lisher's trade.
In Brekkes Ltd. v. Cattel'70 the new tort was used as the sole basis for
granting an injunction to prevent interference with the trade of the plaintiff
transport firm. The unlawful means relied on by Pennycuick, V.-C. consisted
of a resolution by the defendant trade association which was held to be within
the Restrictive Trade Practices Act and not capable of being justified under
the gateway provisions.
More recently, the tort has been relied on by the English Court of Appeal
as the principal ground for imposing liability in tort. In Acrow (Automation)
Ltd. v. Rex Chainbelt Inc.,171 the plaintiff, Acrow, manufactured a product
under license from an American company, S. I. Handling Systems Inc. As
part of the license agreement Rex supplied to Acrow special chain essential
to the manufacturing process. Rex and S.I. were very closely associated and
Rex accepted directions from S.I. A dispute arose between Acrow and S.I.
in relation to the license agreement and Acrow obtained an injunction against
S.I. restraining them from interfering with the manufacture and sale of the
licensed products. S.I. then told Rex that the decision of the English Court
had no bearing on them and that they were to refuse to deliver chain to
Acrow. Rex complied with the direction. Acrow sought, and at first instance
was refused, an injunction against Rex requiring them to use all reasonable
endeavors to supply them with chain.
The plaintiffs appealed, basing their claim principally on the tort of un-
lawful interference with business. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed
the appeal. The unlawful means were found in the defendants refusing to
deliver chain, an omission which meant that they were aiding and abetting
S.I. in their contempt of a High Court injunction. 72 The fact that Rex knew
1661d. at 139.
167 Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd. v. Gardner, [1968] 2 Q.B. 762.
168 Being a restriction within the Act, the instruction was prima facie unlawful and
"deemed to be justified under section 21(1) (d) of the Act."
169 Per Lord Denning, M.R., [1968] 2 Q.B. 762 at 782-783, and per Russell, L.J
at 785-787. The "gateway provisions" under the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956,
S. 21 (i) (a) to (h) outline the circumstances in which a restrictive agreement (defined
in section 6 of the Act) may be justified before the Restrictive Practices Act.
170, [1972] 1 Ch. 105.
171, [19711 3 All. E.R. 1175.
172 Id. at 1181, per Lord Denning, M.R.
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of the injunction and yet still refused to deliver chain meant that they had
deliberately interfered with Acrow's business. Rex had done so by unlawful
means because it was done in obedience to an unlawful direction of S.I. As
Lord Denning put it: "if a person complies with a direction by another, which
he knows or has reason to know, is unlawful, then he is acting unlawfully
himself."' 7 3
An interesting feature of this decision is that the court recognised that
an interference for the purposes of this tort could be caused by an omission,
or a refusal to act. Furthermore, the Acrow decision seems to suggest that a
contempt of court itself, as well as the aiding and abetting of such contempt,
should constitute unlawful means for the purposes of the tort.17 4 This is a
significant development in that the English Court of Appeal had previously
held, in Chapman v. Honig 75 that a criminal contempt of court did not con-
stitute unlawful means for the purposes of founding liability in tort.17 6 The
decision in the Acrow case has raised some doubt as to the validity of the
earlier decision. Unless the courts intend to draw distinctions between the
various types of contempt of court (a course upon which it is submitted it
would be unwise to embark), it would appear that the minority view in
Chapman is the preferable one. Unfortunately, the earlier case was neither
cited, nor referred to by the court in Acrow.
In the various Commonwealth jurisdictions, support has been building
in favour of an intentional tort based on unlawful means. The Australian
High Court appears to have accepted the existence of a tort of this variety. 77
The New Zealand courts have also used the tort of unlawful interference
with another's business as a basis for imposing liability.'78 Similarly, the Cana-
dian courts have had little difficulty in accepting the tort as a valuable means
of regulating intentional conduct resulting in economic loss. As early as 1960,
the Supreme Court affirmed that: "[E]ven though the dominating motive in
a certain course of action may be the furtherance of your own business or
your own interest, you are not entitled to interfere with another man's method
of gaining his living by illegal means". 179
It now appears that the law, rather than utilising three separate eco-
nomic torts involving unlawful means, is moving towards a unified tort based
on intention and unlawful means. It is interesting to note that many of the
older cases involving the nominate torts can be explained on the basis of the
173 Id. See also the judgment of Megaw, L.J. at 1182.
174 This point is noted by K.W. Wedderburn, Note (1972), 35 M.L.R. 184.
175, [1963] 2 Q.B. 502. The Court rejected a claim in tort by a tenant who had
been given notice by his landlord to punish him for having given evidence on subpoena
against the landlord.
170 Per Pearson, L.J., [1963] 2 Q.B. 502 at 518-519; and per Davies, L.J., at 524-
525. Lord Denning, M.R., dissented.
17 7 See Beaudesert Shire Council v. Smith (1966), 40 A.LJ.R. 211.
178 See Emms v. Brad Lovett Ltd., [1973] 1 N.Z.L.R. 282 (N.Z.S.C.).
179 See International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., Local 213 v. Therien (1960),
22 D.L.R. (2d) 1 per Lock, J. at 13. (The "illegal means" which gave rise to the tort
liability in the case involved the infringement of statutes controlling the conduct of
trade union disputes, i.e. section 21 of the Labour Relations Act, S.B.C. 1954, c. 17.
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new tort.180 However, this does not mean that there will be a total disap-
pearance of cases involving the torts of conspiracy, intimidation and inducing
breach of contract. It is probably true that there will be more resort by
plaintiffs to the new tort in future, in view of the fact that it removes the
need to prove some of the detailed requirements of the nominate torts.
Unlike the tort of inducing breach of contract, for example, there is no
need to prove a breach of contract under the new tort.'8' Also, the tort re-
moves the necessity of proving a combination or conspiracy, as was required
under the tort of conspiracy to injure by unlawful means. It has already beenjudicially noted that the emergence of this new principle of tort liability has
lead to a decline in the usefulness of the tort of conspiracy. 82 So long as the
defendant has used unlawful means the court now need only find an inten-
tion to injure, damage and an absence of justification.
With respect to the question of what constitutes unlawful means for the
purposes of this tort, one cannot help but be struck by the patchwork ap-
proach which the courts have displayed in dealing with this concept. Although
there are a number of torts which depend on proof of unlawful means, there
has been a marked lack of consistency in the decisions of the court. Indeed,
the judges have drawn what one writer describes as a "curiously ragged
line"' 83 in relation to this concept. It has been suggested that:
[It would make for brevity, logic and elegance if the principle could be ttated
that the definition of "illegal" or "unlawful" was the same under all four rubrics.
The reason for the requirement is clearly the same in all four cases, namely, the
maintenance of the right to take lawful action by way of trade competition and
the like in present society. Unhappily, no such clear principle emerges from the
authorities.184
It is not proposed here to give a detailed analysis of what constitutes or
should constitute unlawful means: this has been done elsewhere. 185 It will
simply be noted that not all wrongs amount to unlawful means for the pur-
poses of the unlawful interference tort. Also, since the emergence of the tort
of causing loss by unlawful means no consistent pattern has as yet appeared
from the judicial pronouncements on the subject. Yet, this is a developing
area of the law and as more cases come before the courts the opportunities for
180 For example, Tarleton v. McGawley (1793), 1 Peake 270, (firing a cannon at
traders about to do business with a rival ship); Garrett v. Taylor (1620), Cr. Jac. 567,
(threats of violence against customers of a rival merchant); and Keeble v. Hickeringill
(1705), 11 East 574n (frightening schoolboys with guns to deter them from going to
the plaintiffs school).
181 If an unlawful interference does in fact cause a breach of an existing contract,
there will be an overlap between the torts of unlawful interference and inducing breach
of contract (by indirect procurement) and the plaintiff will have a choice of causes of
action.
182 Pete's Towing Services Ltd. v. Northern Industrial Union of Workers, [1970]
N.Z.L.R. 32 (NZ.S.C.). Speight, J. remarked that: "it is now immaterial that there was
a combination if the means themselves are tortious." (at 55).
183 J. D. Heydon, Justification in Intentional Economic Loss, supra, note 21, at 177.
184 Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, supra, note 49 at 409-410.
185 J. D. Heydon, Justification in Intentional Economic Loss, supra, note 21 at
172-177; Clerk & Lindsell, supra, note 49 at 409 et seq.
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the logical and consistent development of the concept will be increased. It is
hoped that the judges will recognise the importance of this new tort and direct
their attention to straightening the "curiously ragged" line which at present
runs through the case law.
IV CONCLUSIONS
From amidst the recent judicial activity involving the torts of inten-
tionally causing economic loss, the tort of causing loss by unlawful means (or
unlawful interference) appears likely to develop as an important method of
imposing liability on defendants who, with intent, and without justification,
inflict economic injury on their rivals. It is submitted that one can predict
with some confidence that this tort is here to stay, and could well continue on
from where the various nominate torts leave off. More and more, judges seem
inclined to apply the new tort rather than become bogged down with a con-
sideration of the intricate and complex requirements of the nominate torts.
The new tort is a manifestation of a judicial policy, recognised since
the late nineteenth century, that defendants should not be allowed deliberately
to injure another's financial or business interests by the use of unlawful means.
This cannot be regarded as legitimate competition, a concept likewise jealously
guarded by the common law. The attitude of the common law was illustrated
in the development of the various nominate torts. Now, when a more unified
principle is emerging, the rationale behind the nominate torts applies with
equal force to that new principle.
It has been demonstrated that the recent developments in the intentional
torts have not been solely concerned with the tort of unlawful interference.
The form of the tort of inducing breach of contract which does not require
unlawful means (i.e. direct procurement) has also been the subject of judicial
activity, as was exemplified in the Einhorn case. It is clear that this develop-
ment stands on less firm a footing than the tort of unlawful interference. This
is because the Einhorn tort comes very close to reversing an important com-
mon law rule, sanctified in 1898 in Allen v. Flood, that no liability in tort
will be imposed for a mere intention to cause economic loss. Such a drastic
break with traditional thinking will inevitably take more time to become ac-
cepted law than a development which is more a refinement of old principles
than a totally new approach.
Clearly, the nominate tort of inducing breach of contract by direct
procurement may continue to be an important part of the law. If all the re-
quirements of this tort can be met, plaintiffs will continue to base their claims
on this older cause of action. Indeed, they may be forced to rely on the
nominate tort if the developments involving the tort of interference short of
breach are not willingly accepted by the Canadian courts.
This paper has also dealt with other aspects of the intentional torts
which have been canvassed in the recent case law. The question of proof of
the intention element in the tort of inducing breach of contract has been
examined in some detail. The developments in this area are significant not
only in relation to that one tort, but affect all the torts where intentional eco-
nomic loss is inflicted on the plaintiff. For, while the law retains the rule
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against liability where negligent acts cause economic loss, it is vital for a
plaintiff to know what he must do to bring himself within the ambit of the
intentional torts.
The various torts which have been considered form part of the body
of common law rules which regulate economic behaviour. It has been the
task of the judges to chart an appropriate course between too much competi-
tion and too little. The result has been the intentional torts. Yet, as has been
illustrated, many aspects of this body of law are in a state of turmoil at the
present time. One response to this situation has been to suggest that Parlia-
ment should develop appropriate rules to regulate this area of the law. How-
ever, it has not yet been demonstrated that Parliament could achieve more
satisfactory results than does the present law.-86
The turmoil is in the process of working itself out. As more consideration
is given to such questions as the dividing line between intention and negli-
gence, the concept of unlawful means, and the notion of justification of
intentional conduct, the intentional torts will become a more satisfactory body
of law, and more capable of meeting the objects they were developed to serve.
186 See J. D. Heydon, Economic Torts, supra, note 21 at 91.
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